COMMANDERS DIGEST

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Services Set Policy On Christmas Leave, Early Discharges

The Armed Forces will observe liberal leave policies and permit early discharges of personnel for the Christmas season this year.

The Defense Department said the holiday leave period will extend from mid-December, 1968, through mid-January, 1969. This extended period will, as in the past, insure that most servicemen have an opportunity for leave over one of the two holidays during the period.

The leave policy will apply overseas where the military mission permits, the Defense Department said. However, DOD said, it does not apply to personnel serving in Southeast Asia where operational requirements preclude changing normal leave policy during the holiday season.

(The Army said it will observe liberal leave policies which will extend from Dec. 21, 1968, through Jan. 5, 1969. This leave policy will apply in CONUS and overseas as the respective military missions permit. It does not apply, the Army said, to personnel serving in combat areas where operational requirements preclude changing normal leave policies during the holiday season. The Navy and Air Force said they had nothing to add to the Defense Department's policy on holiday leave).

The Defense Department said military commanders will, when possible, schedule individual leaves to coincide with non-peak travel periods on commercial transportation systems in order to give service personnel greater opportunity for making satisfactory travel arrangements.

The Armed Forces will also have an "early release program" for the Christmas season permitting the early separation of those personnel

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BROTHERS—Capt. Worth H. Bagley, USN, foreground, has assumed command of the heavy cruiser Canberra. His brother, RAdm. David H. Bagley, USN, (background) is currently embarked on the Canberra as Commander, Cruiser - Destroyer Group Seventh Fleet.

Army Mohawk Aircraft Sets Unofficial Record

A new unofficial world altitude record has been set by two pilots from the Army's Combat Surveillance School at Ft. Huachuca, Ariz., in an Army OV-1 Mohawk.

Lt. Col. Clifford E. Johnson, Jr., and 1st Lt. Timothy A. Agersea went to an altitude of 37,000 feet in the Mohawk, bettering the previous record for this type of aircraft (32,000 feet) by almost a mile.

Until recently, Army Aviation never had an entry in the world record books. In classifying the OV-1 Mohawk for world record entry, the aircraft was put in category C-1.F, Group II. This includes all turbo-prop aircraft weighing more than 13,227 pounds, but less than 17,636 pounds.

It took 23 minutes and 15 seconds to climb to 37,000 feet from the 4660 feet altitude level of Libby Army Airfield in Arizona.

Armistice Violations By North Korea Reported by UNC

North Korean violations of the armistice agreement of July 27, 1953, have continued at such a dangerous level since the January 1968 attempt on President Park's life that the U.N. Command in Korea has made a further report to the U.N. Security Council.

Highlights of the report as carried by a State Department publication dated Nov. 4 are as follows:

1—Since January 21, when a team of 31 North Korean commandos infiltrated into the Republic of Korea in an attempt to assassinate President Park there have been 241 serious incidents caused by armed North Korean bands carrying automatic weapons, grenades, mines, and explosives for the purpose of spying, murder, terrorism, and sabotage. These incidents occurred without provocation; all have involved violations of the armistice agreement by North Korean forces.

2—The incidents have resulted in a large number of casualties; the killing of 62 U.N. Command military personnel, and the wounding of 130 others; the death of 10 Republic of Korea civilians, including three police, and the wounding of 11 more.

3—A demilitarized zone some 4,000 meters wide is divided equally between the north and south by the military demarcation line. Both the DMZ and the demarcation line were established by the armistice agreement and are clearly marked. The crossing of the line by personnel of either side is prohibited by Article 1 of the armistice agreement. Nonetheless, North Korea has continued to dispatch across the demarcation line armed bands for purposes of spying, murder, terrorism, and sabotage in

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Cir #1

Air Force Plans Release of Mobilized ANG Units

The Air Force plans to release 1,325 officers and airmen in three Air National Guard units mobilized earlier this year by Dec. 20.

The Air Force identified the three units Nov. 25 as the 174th Tactical Fighter Group (TFG), the 175th (TFG) (both called in May) and the 189th Tactical Reconnaissance Group (TRG) (called up in January). The subordinate units of the three ANG outfits will also be released.

Original plans called for the officers and airmen to be released from active duty during the April-June 1969 time-frame.

The 174th and 175th TFGs — equipped with F-86 fighters—have filled a Forward Air Controller/Air Liaison Officer training role at Cannon AFB, N. M. The Air Force said this training mission can now be assumed by regular component units using the T/AT-33 aircraft, long used by the Air Force as a jet trainer.

The 154th Tactical Reconnaissance Sq. (TRS) of the 189th TRG has completed its directed temporary four-month overseas tour at Itazuke AB, Japan, and will be replaced by another mobilized ANG unit, the 192nd TRS, presently stationed at Richards-Gebaur AFB, Mo.

On Oct. 2 Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford announced actions by the Air Force which would "return all the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units and personnel, mobilized earlier this year," to inactive status by June 30, 1969. He said the action would affect about 16,000 men together with their equipment.

Secretary Clifford's statement said one aeromedical evacuation squadron and three aerial port squadrons would be demobilized by the end of the year. Those combat units on duty in the Pacific area were to be replaced by regular Air Force squadrons.

Most of the Air Force reserve units were mobilized last January following the North Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo. The remainder were called up in May to meet additional Air Force requirements in Southeast Asia and other areas.

Certain units were deployed to Korea and SEA. Other units were deployed to bases within the CONUS, thereby freeing regular Air Force squadrons for overseas assignments. Some reserve personnel were later reassigned as individuals, both in the CONUS and overseas, to meet valid Air Force Requirements.

The law under which the reserves were mobilized permits their retention on active duty for up to 24 months. However, their situation has been under continuous study by the Air Force with the objective of returning them to inactive status at a time and in a manner consistent with the national interest.

RESERVE FORCES TO BE DEMOBILIZED DECEMBER 12, 1968

	UNIT	HOME STATION	CURRENT DUTY STATION
82	Aerial Port Sq (AFRES)	Travis AFB, Calif.	Travis AFB, Calif.
88	Aerial Port Sq (AFRES)	McGuire AFB, N.J.	McGuire AFB, N.J.
171	Aeromedical Alt Gp (ANG)	Gtr. Pittsbgh Arpt, Pa.	Gtr Pittsburgh Arpt.
86	Aerial Port Sq (AFRES)	McChord AFB, Wash.	McChord AFB, Wash.
138	Tactical Fighter Sq (ANG)	Hancock Field, N.Y.	Cannon AFB, N.M.
174	Tactical Fighter Gp (ANG)		Cannon AFB, N.M.
174	Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Sq (ANG)	Hancock Field, N.Y.	Cannon AFB, N.M.
104	Tactical Fighter Sq (ANG)	Martin Arpt, Md.	Cannon AFB, N.M.
175	Tactical Fighter Gp (ANG)	Martin Arpt, Md.	Cannon AFB, N.M.
175	Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Sq (ANG)	Martin Arpt, Md.	Cannon AFB, N.M.
154	Tactical Recon Sq (ANG)	Little Rock AFB, Ark.	Little Rock AFB, Ark.
189	Tactical Recon Gp (ANG)	Little Rock AFB, Ark.	Little Rock AFB, Ark.
189	Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Sq (ANG)	Little Rock AFB, Ark.	Little Rock AFB, Ark.
189	Combat Support Sq (ANG)	Little Rock AFB, Ark.	Little Rock AFB, Ark.
189	Tactical Dispensary (ANG)	Little Rock AFB, Ark.	Little Rock AFB, Ark.
123	Recon Technical Sq (ANG)	Little Rock AFB, Ark.	Little Rock AFB, Ark.
189	Communications Flt (ANG)	Little Rock AFB, Ark.	Little Rock AFB, Ark.
189	Field Maint. Sq (ANG)	Little Rock AFB, Ark.	Little Rock AFB, Ark.

Army Awards Contract For TOW Missile System

The Army has awarded a $55 million contract for the production of the TOW Antitank Assault Missile System.

The TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) is intended for employment at company or battalion level and will knock out any known armored vehicle.

Under the contract, awarded to the Hughes Aircraft Co., missiles will be manufactured at the Hughes facility, Tucson, Ariz., and launchers and ancillary equipment will be produced at sites in the Los Angeles area.

After launch, the missile unreels in flight two hair-thin wires through which it receives steering signals. All a gunner has to do, the Army said, is keep the sight on target and the missile is automatically guided to point of impact.

TOW has been subjected to intensive development testing during which the missiles were handled by soldiers under a wide variety of simulated battlefield conditions, including air drops.

Gunners have successfully demonstrated TOW's long-range firepower and accuracy by scoring direct hits on moving targets at ranges of more than a mile while shooting from both ground emplacements and from helicopters.

The missile also has proven its effectiveness in knocking out bunkers and concrete fortifications.

TRAINING INSPECTION—Maj. Gen. Willard Pearson, chief of individual training, Department of the Army, accepts a statue of a drill sergeant from Maj. Gen. Charles M. Mount Jr., commanding general, Ft. Polk, La. Gen. Pearson visited Ft. Polk for a tour of its training facilities.

MTMTS Centralizes Control Of Personal Property Moving

Control of worldwide traffic management responsibility for the Department of Defense Personal Property Moving and Storage Program was centralized Dec. 1 by the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service.

Under the realignment, all MTMTS personal property traffic management elements will be placed under the direct supervision and control of Col. Joseph J. Kennedy, USAF, Director of Personal Property at MTMTS headquarters in Washington.

Maj. Gen. John J. Lane, USA, MTMTS Commander, said the centralization is another step in improving MTMTS's efforts to insure high quality moving and storage for the household goods and baggage of Armed Forces personnel. He noted DOD spends more than $500 million annually for this support program.

Under the realignment, the personal property directorates at the MTMTS Eastern and Western Area headquarters will be redesignated the MTMTS Eastern and Western Personal Property Operations Offices and will remain at their present locations in Brooklyn, N.Y., and Oakland, Calif.

The Personal Property Division of the Eastern Area Field Office at St. Louis, Mo., will remain and be renamed the MTMTS Central Personal Property Operations Office.

The Eastern Operations Office will be headed by Col. Harold G. Wells, Jr., USAF. The Central unit will have Lt. Col. Budd E. Baumgardner, USAF, as director. Cdr. Donald E. Henker, USN, will head the Western operation.

"Installation transportation officers are not affected by the realignment," Colonel Kennedy said.

Armistice Violations

(Continued from Page 1)

both the southern half of the DMZ and elsewhere in the Republic of Korea.

4—The U.N. Command, in seeking to end the serious incidents and violations of the armistice agreement by North Korea, has made repeated proposals in the Military Armistice Commission for an investigation of these incidents by joint observed teams as provided under the armistice agreement. North Korea has either ignored or rejected these proposals, thus preventing fact-finding investigations by joint observer teams despite the fact that such investigations would not entail the entry of the teams into territory under North Korean control.

5—North Korea's refusal to permit the functioning of the observer teams and its abuse of the Military Armistice Commission has left the U.N. Command with no alternative but to institute defensive and protective measures to defend the territorial integrity of the Republic of Korea and to assure the safety of its own personnel. It will continue, however, to pursue a policy of restraint, affording no grounds whatsoever for escalation by North Korea of its hostile activities.

Christmas Leave

(Continued from Page 1)

whose normal release from active duty otherwise would occur between mid-December, 1968 and early January, 1969. Individual release dates will be timed to permit such personnel to be home for Christmas. It is anticipated that these early separations will be accomplished generally about one or two weeks earlier than the normal separation date.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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A Problem in Foreign Policy

OUR COMMUNICATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

"Accurate analysis is the basis of all intelligent political action," Covey T. Oliver, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress, said recently.

However, he pointed out, we have dangerous communications problems with Latin America owing to a lack of factual information on which to base such analyses, to distorted information, and to a volatile U.S. public opinion.

Below are excerpts from Mr. Oliver's address of November 15 to the National Conference of Editorial Writers.

Domestic support is the most common problem in foreign policy. Foreign aid, I suppose, furnishes the most conspicuous example of the predicament, but I could name others.

It seems to be a fact of life that most intelligent long-range policies—like the policy of aiding our neighbors—must be implemented quietly, with the expectation of occasional reverses, and with the hope of obtaining only limited objectives—and those slowly. These are not attributes that are easy to grasp or emotionally satisfying for many voters or all their representatives. Part of the solution is the responsibility of those who write editorials.

A Volatile Public Opinion

Those of us in press or government who deal with Latin America must be prepared for an unusually volatile domestic public opinion. You might say that the U.S. public has a "Latin temperament" as to Latin America, but this is a bit too simple.

What we really have as a people is an extraordinarily high level of conscience about Latin America—combined with a moderately low level of day-to-day interest. A well-known journalist put it neatly when he said that "The American public will do anything for Latin America except read about it."

Gentlemen, this combination of a deep moral commitment and lack of whole, clear, steady information is dangerous. Let us examine the reasons for it.

The lack of "news"—in the narrow sense—seems relatively simple: Latin America, despite its ups and downs and occasional unconstitutional changes, has been developing more smoothly than most of the less well-developed southern part of the planet. There are no international or civil wars; economic and social development is progressing steadily, if too slowly; and the people have been surprisingly patient. In short, there are problems, but they are not spectacular compared to those of other major regions.

Our high level of conscience cannot be explained so directly, but here are some of its components:

- Latin America is the only developing region of the world that is totally a part of our western civilization.
- Latin America is, further, as deeply committed in spirit to concepts of democracy and human equality as we are. Since the days of Jefferson, Clay and Webster these shared beliefs have been a special bond.
- There are old and important commercial ties, and much good has, can and will continue to come from them.

But with Latin Americans there is a communications problem here too. We must always be sure that we show ourselves as we really are. In default of this, too many Latin Americans, especially the young, will continue to believe outmoded Marxist notions that developed nations are inevitable imperialistic exploiters of underdeveloped areas. Let us watch our rhetoric and beware of mythology—or, for you, detect and reject it.

Also . . . we are a moralistic people. And our morals include somewhat of a guilty conscience about our relative good fortune in the Hemisphere, even though our energies and our virtues had a great deal to do with bringing it about.

Also far too few here realize and give weight to related but obverse socio-psychological factors in Latin Americans attitudes: envy, shame, a feeling of helplessness when facing the overwhelming presence and preponderance of the United States.

Why We Support Regional Unification

Here I break stride in analysis briefly to mention a very important point: the United States is not happy in a world of many "normal" states and two or possibly three super-powers. Whether we always realize it or not, we have been trying ever since World War II, even against our foreseeable short range interests, to help bring into being new aggregations, beyond "normal" states, of from 200 to 300 million people.

Our support for European unification was a part of this. So is our support for the economic unification of Latin America. This unification is important as a final state of economic development. What is frequently overlooked is that it is equally important for socio-political good health in inter-American relations.

All of these factors, and their counterparts in Latin American attitudes, have combined to produce what I have called the "Control/Blame Syndrome."

In this syndrome, even those who think they reject the concept of intervention nevertheless feel that the United States somehow controls or should control—day-to-day, incident-to-incident—what is going on to the south. The U.S. is therefore to be blamed when anything goes wrong. This can lead, for example, to the conclusion that U.S. policy has been hopelessly ineffective whenever a Latin American military establishment overthrows a civilian government.

Now, a military coup d'état does, of course, represent a disappointment to U.S. hopes and a setback to the goals of the Hemisphere, as expressed in the Alliance Charter. But there is no acceptable, short-range U.S. policy or influence which could prevent all disappointments. The only U.S. policy capable of exercising any really profound influence on this problem is the one of marginal influence through commitment to long-term development.

On the other hand, any fair assessment of our policy will show that we have not encouraged military coups. It would not require wild optimism to conclude that our policies may even have helped a little to ease the paths of viable, reformist, elected governments.

The Control/Blame Syndrome, however, is seen at work when we fail to distinguish between our marked preference for good, democratic government and abstention from intervention to put a deposed leader back in power.

Allow me, then, to mention a few things that I would like to see editorializing do.

Getting the Facts

The first step in anyone's list, I suppose, is to get the facts.

I think I have sometimes seen cases, referring to your profession, when perhaps editorialists have not quite waded through all the factual reporting. For example, on January 28, 1965, when I was Ambassador to Colombia, President Valencia neatly and without causing any perturbation dismissed a Minister who had rather been built up in the press as a coup threat. At the same time, the Colombian President declared that an illegal national work stoppage would be met firmly, with the full authority of the State.

A very respectable American journal reported these facts the next day. However, on the day following that report, the same paper ran an editorial implying that Colombia had a hopelessly ineffective administration!

Report on Progress

I grant that achievement of nebulous developmental goals is rarely as spectacular as failure. Granted that I do not expect to see many headlines like "U.S. Arms *Not* Used to Overthrow Reformist Regime". . . . But I still hope that there might be more good interpretive articles and editorials.

There are more such in Latin America's "better" press about us, by far, than there are in our papers about them. And what we publish here gets picked up and run down there. It is discouraging to them to read U.S. datelines only over "calamity, failure, all is lost, and octogenarian gives birth to triplets" type stories.

It seems to me that the enormous U.S. role in the collection and transmission of the Hemisphere's news gives us a special responsibility for keeping the Hemisphere better informed.

Results of Yankee Preaching

The *tone* of our Latin American coverage is at least as important as the content. Some U.S. commentary represents a point of view that is both ethnocentric and supercilious, but ethnocentrism is a fine way to keep ourselves ignorant and superciliousness is a fine way to keep our neighbors angry.

Somehow, we not only expect our neighbors to do as we do—we sometimes seem to expect them to do better. Again, an example: Some U.S. papers have lectured Latin America in highly offensive terms about military expenditures and have equated excessive defense budgets with a distinterest in development. The objective of these lectures is commendable. Both the premises and the strategy are deplorable.

Latin America has so far avoided an arms race with great success, not only in comparison to other regions but in absolute terms. Despite certain outstanding exceptions, Latin America as a whole has also been notably successful in controlling military expenditures over a period of many years. There is, moreover, no evidence that any level of military expenditure is related to political ambitions: in point of fact, cheap weapons tend to be more useful for coups d'etat than jet planes and aircraft carriers.

Finally, and emphatically, Latin America is not disposed to hear lectures on any of these subjects from a nation that, for reasons we understand but they may not, spends more than half its national budget on defense. All it would take to get the message across without violent rejection reactions—strengthening the forces of extreme and short-sighted conventional nationalism—would be to be more measured and more understanding in the analysis, above all avoiding Yankee preachiness.

To Achieve Understanding

Mose of the credit for Latin American successes, and most of the blame for the shortcomings, belong exactly in Latin America. We do both ourselves and our neighbors a favor to insist on that point.

The United States has a marginal, but nevertheless important, capacity for complicating Latin America's problems. We have a marginal and equally important ability to help.

DOD Establishes Kindergartens at Overseas Schools

The Department of Defense has established tuition-free kindergarten schooling for dependents at military installations around the world.

Currently there are 305 Defense-sponsored schools world-wide with an enrollment of 163,000 children in grades 1-12. It has been estimated an additional 20,000 children of kindergarten age will come under the new Defense Overseas Dependent Education Program.

The kindergarten program is now being implemented. An 81-page curriculum containing guidelines for its establishment has been issued by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (M&RA).

It is planned to convert non-appropriated fund teachers into the new program. The new DOD Instruction (1342.8) establishing the program defines a kindergarten teacher as "one who is employed under the authority of the Department of Defense Overseas Teachers Pay and Personnel Practices Act (PL-86-91), as amended; 20 USC 901 et seq.), who is fully qualified in kindergarten or primary education, who is a member of the school teaching staff, and who is assigned to a class or section of the kindergarten to direct the educational experiences of students in the classes."

The new instruction further states that waivers on qualifications will be considered by area superintendents on a year-to-year basis.

As kindergartens are established on military installations as part of the Defense Overseas Dependents School Program, all kindergartens operating on a private basis will be discontinued. (In the past Air Force and Navy personnel had to pay a tuition fee of from $12 to $16 a month to send their children to kindergarten. Army personnel in Europe either paid the fee or in some cases non-appropriated funds (welfare, etc.) were used to defray expenses).

The new tuition-free kindergarten program became effective with passage of the Defense Appropriations Act.

A study conducted by Ball State University, Muncie, Ind., for the Defense Department determined that kindergarten education should become an integral part of the total program of the DOD Overseas Dependent Schools and that funds to support the program should come from money designated for this purpose and not from allocations already made to the military departments for the overseas school program.

All DOD Overseas Dependents School Kindergartens will be under the direct supervision of the elementary school principal of the school where they are located.

Under the Defense instruction establishing free kindergarten classes at overseas dependent schools are the following facts:

1. Kindergarten students must reach their fifth birthday by December 31 of the school year they enroll in kindergarten.

2. Kindergarten is not required for enrollment in the first grade in DOD Overseas Dependent Schools.

3. Kindergarten will be available under the same rules of eligibility that apply to other grades in DOD Overseas Dependents Schools and approved tuition-fee schools.

4. Kindergarten classes will meet either during the morning or afternoon. Normally, class sessions will be two and one-half hours daily, including break periods.

5. Kindergarten classes with 15-25 students are recommended. Classes will not exceed 30 students.

6. Kindergarten teachers may teach two classes per day, morning or afternoon, wherever the enrollment is adequate. Teachers who teach only one session daily will be classified as half-time and will receive one-half salary.

TACTICAL AIR COMMANDERS—VAdm. Ralph W. Cousins (left), hosts his Air Force counterpart, Gen. George S. Brown, during a meeting on board the Task Force 77 flagship Constellation. Adm. Cousins commands the Seventh Fleet's Carrier Striking Force and Gen. Brown commands the Seventh Air Force. The two commanders coordinate an extensive air arm supporting ground forces fighting in South Vietnam.

Gen. Chesarek Outlines Trends Shaping Army of 1970s

Lt. Gen. F. J. Chesarek, Army assistant Vice Chief of Staff, says there are positive trends of tactics and associated hardware, support, command and control, and management systems which when taken together will determine the size and shape of the Army of the 1970s.

Speaking before the Association of the United States Army in Washington, General Chesarek said, "The ever rising cost of national defense compels us to consider manpower conservation as a principal element in the cost of equation. Postwar domestic and international demands can be expected to put further pressures on the defense budget."

He said we must improve our ability to tap the resourcefulness of improvement, "which offers substantial payoffs for relatively small investment. Industry must keep abreast of all the elements of change, and the Army will do well to develop cooperative measures to capitalize on industry's innovative capability to help it come out on top."

He mentioned eight trends he believes dominate the Army's professional landscape.

General Chesarek said the first trend deals with night operations. Night operations will become much more extensive and meaningful as night vision devices continue to improve. This opens new spectrums of tactics, type and density of equipment, intelligence, target acquisition, and command and control.

"Equipment-wise, we must consider three aspects: needs of the individual soldier, combat surveillance, and target acquisition. Work in all areas is being pushed hard, with emphasis on the immediate needs of our forces in Vietnam."

2. The advantages of tactical air mobility have been proved, and the practice is certain to be expanded with unlimited scope for innovation. This includes not only the capacity to move people and materiel of all types but also surveillance aircraft functioning under any kind of operating condition and gunships with a 24-hour, all weather capability. We also must increase aircraft survivability and reduce vulnerability, especially to fire.

3. Weight is an impediment to battle. This applies across the board. This fact is receiving priority attention. "Weight has a direct bearing on the tactical air mobility point I just made, and it goes considerably further." We have moved aggressively in the area of individual equipment and are now looking at the total spectrum. "Tactical mobility is the sum of many factors. We relearn this lesson every time we engage in combat—and unlearn it in peacetime when we become enamoured with the niceties of luxury and gadgetry."

4. "Delivery of heavy firepower at point targets in very short time span is highly productive." Ways are being sought to improve the means and techniques of application. This includes the need for improved target acquisition systems of all types—radar, electronic devices and direction finding systems. "A key consideration here is the improvement of accuracy. With better accuracy, ammunition consumption is reduced and a big cumulative pay-off is produced.

5. Entirely new logistics support systems are evolving based on computer, airlift and containerization. "I have long felt that we in the Army have not capitalized on industry's proven capability to assist us in the complex business."

6. Advances in communications and data manipulation capability are revolutionizing command and control. The computer's capacity for storage of tactical and logistical information and rapid computation can be applied to a multitude of tasks.

7. "Reliability of equipment is becoming an absolute necessity as maintenance becomes more complex and costly. We must be prepared to pay for this product in initial investment costs, confident that in short order we will be able to amortize the investment by savings in logistics support and manpower."

8. "There is a growing realization of the total cost of manpower. This realization leads to pressures to get more utility from each soldier and to reduce the numbers needed."

These trends, including others of some significance, "will be the Army's bench marks in calculating its future needs.

"It is quite clear to me that the end

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VIETNAMESE HONORED—Lt. Gen. Lewis Walt, assistant commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, pins the Army Commendation Medal to the uniform of Private Nguyen Van San, one of two Vietnamese marines honored at a Fire Base Glenn ceremony in November. The fire base was one of Gen. Walt's stops during his day-long visit to the Mobile Riverine Force.

Air Force Systems Command Activates Air Mobility Division

The Air Force Systems Command has activated a new management organization called the Air Mobility Division to support today's requirements for tactical and strategic mobility.

The Air Force said the need to provide a wide range of plausible options for air operations has placed major emphasis on mobility. These options include the possibility the Air Force might not always be able to rely on prepared overseas bases in fulfilling its responsibilities.

Under the jurisdiction of AFSC's Aeronautical Systems Division at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, the Air Mobility Division was established to develop equipment which will improve the capability of Air Force operational and support forces to rapidly deploy to, and operate from, "Bare Base" sites anywhere in the world.

USAF combat forces would be able to fly to these bases, which might have no facilities other than a runway parking space and a water supply, set up the essential equipment, and be ready to conduct combat operations within hours.

Everything else needed to maintain operations could be flown in by aircrews. This would include collapsible and prefabricated hangers, barracks, dining halls, communications centers, hospitals, maintenance shops and operating equipment.

Headed by Col. Gerald K. Hendricks, Air Mobility Division will support the continuing and expanded effort of the Bare Base concept.

The Bare Base project took the place of "Project Gray Eagle," which failed to meet the mobility concept it was designed for. Much of the equipment was of World War II vintage, was heavy and much of it was not air-transportable.

Under the Bare Base concept most or all of their essential equipment and personnel is carried with deployed units to austere locations from which they would be required to start flying fighter missions in a matter of hours. These squadrons might have to sustain combat operations at a wartime sortie rate for as long as 180 days with only replacement aircraft, expendibles, war consumables and spares added.

Much of the equipment included in a Bare Base set is composed of air transportable modules.

Already developed under the program are aluminum and plastic sandwich structures that will serve as shipping containers during air transportation. These structures can expand to three times their size to become shops or living quarters at the new air base.

Every facet of air base operations and problems of erection of structures has been considered, from integral ventilation and heating ducts to pre-cut wiring already color and size coded. The design criteria are aimed at producing structures virtually anyone can unpack and erect.

All items under development are being made functionally efficient; light and small; fire, fungus and wind resistant; simple to erect and maintain; reliable and durable in all climates, except Arctic; standardized with existing equipment where possible; transportable in the C-130E; and compatable with the 463L Cargo Handling System.

Mobile showers and toilets, transportable laundries, lightweight field furniture and many other items of equipment have also been developed.

Army Trends

(Continued from Page 7)

of the Vietnam war will be accompanied by two conflicting resource positions. On the one hand the Army can expect to be pressed hard to reduce its spending. At the same time, some of the new systems will be reaching the productions stage with their high price tags.

"That portion of the gross national product which is devoted to defense appropriations may be considered an expression of the American public's concern with the perceived threat to our national security. If we start with the limits we can derive from an economic analysis of our budget projection, we may find that priorities are easier to establish for the total mix of our hardware."

AIR FORCE CROSS—Maj. Larry D. Armstrong (right) receives the Air Force Cross from Gen. William W. Momyer, commander, Tactical Air Command, at Langley AFB, Va. Maj. Armstrong was honored for action as an F-4D aircraft commander in Vietnam. He was also awarded four Distinguished Flying Crosses and 11 Air Medals. He now serves as an F-4 instructor pilot with the 15th Tactical Fighter Wing, MacDill AFB, Fla.

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